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I. Introduction
The United States has long faced a history of accidents relating to alcohol-impaired driving.
In order to combat the problem, Congress enacted a federal statute in 1984 directing states to raise
the in-state drinking age to twenty-one or, as a consequence, receive less highway funding.1 The
aim was to stop drivers who were younger than the requisite drinking age from crossing state
borders to drink where the legal drinking age was lower.2 According to Congress, and with the
Supreme Court’s stamp of approval, the statute was enacted as a means for states to secure federal
funds by keeping their highways safe.3
Today, all fifty states have enacted laws that prohibit motorists from driving with a blood
alcohol concentration (“BAC”)4—defined as the level of alcohol in the blood—that exceeds
0.08%.5 Even with these laws in place, drunk driving is the leading cause of highway deaths,6
killing more than 10,000 individuals in alcohol-impaired driving crashes per year.7 Of all motor
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23 U.S.C. § 163 (2018); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
2
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.
3
Id. at 208.
4
ROBERT L. DUPONT, THE SELFISH BRAIN: LEARNING FROM ADDICTION 131 (1997). (“When a person drinks alcohol,
the alcohol is distributed . . . evenly throughout the person’s body. . . The biggest factors governing BAC, however,
are not gender or weight, but how much a person drinks and how long after the drink is consumed the BAC is checked.
This is because the liver is efficient at metabolizing alcohol. The liver can break down one drink of alcohol (0.5
ounce) into carbon dioxide and water in about an hour and a half.”) Id. at 132.
5
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016); see also Editorial Staff, Legal BAC Limits in Different
States, Counties, & Cities, https://www.alchol.org/dui/bac-limits/ (last updated July 18, 2019). Some states are
considering enacting a lower BAC limit—0.05%—with Utah leading the way by already adopting such a measure.
Angie Schmitt, Other States Should Copy Utah’s New Drunk Driving Rule, STREETSBLOG USA, (Jan. 4, 2019)
https://usa.streetsblog.org/2019/01/04/why-other-states-should-copy-utahs-new-drunk-driving-rule/.
6
Becky Ianotta, New NHTSA Numbers Show Drunk Driving Still the Leading Cause of Highway Deaths, MOTHERS
AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.madd.org/press-release/new-nhtsa-numbers-show-drunkdriving-still-the-leading-cause-of-highway-deaths/.
7
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vehicle accidents, 29% are the result of alcohol-impaired driving incidents.8 These statistics reflect
the problem this country faces in its uphill battle to combat drunk-driving related incidents.
The statistics also provide the underlying reasons for why most states have enacted
“implied consent laws.” These laws pronounce that drivers agree to submit to chemical tests of
the breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content if asked to do so by a law
enforcement officer, just by virtue of driving in that state.9 While the purpose of such laws is to
impose penalties on drivers who refuse to undergo testing, the laws may nonetheless violate the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches of the person. Drivers are faced
with a conundrum, because while they deserve their constitutionally protected right to be free from
warrantless searches, implied consent laws genuinely leave them with minimal options.
This Comment addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mitchell v. Wisconsin,10
which held that police officers may “almost always” order a warrantless blood test under a statute
like the ones mentioned above, to measure an unconscious driver’s BAC without offending the
individual’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches of their person. Part II of this
Comment will describe the history of driving under the influence (“DUI”) or while intoxicated
(“DWI”) laws11 and the reasons behind their implementation. Part II will also address the Supreme
Court’s recognition of the serious issue that the United States has faced with impaired driving.
Part III will then provide an objective overview of cases that were decided before Mitchell
and their implications on criminal procedural law under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Part IV will comprehensively break down the split in Mitchell, focusing primarily on the plurality,

8

Id.
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https://driversed.com/resources/terms/implied_consent_law.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
10
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
11
These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this Comment for brevity.
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written by Justice Alito, and the dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor. Part V pays special
attention to how Mitchell fits with past precedent, if at all. It begs to answer the question of why
there was a sudden need for change in DUI law standing doctrine and how the opinion should be
applied moving forward. In total, this Comment will argue that the Supreme Court should either
come forward with a bright-line rule using the traditional analysis focusing on the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment, or state that DUI cases are subject to a public
policy reasonableness standard—the governmental need of ensuring safe roads. By resting
Mitchell on two rationales, lower courts will struggle to determine the parameters and limits of the
decision, thereby possibly jeopardizing Fourth Amendment protections as a whole.
II. Historical Background of DUI Laws and Their Significance
In the United States today, one person dies nearly every 50 minutes because of a motor
vehicle crash involving an alcohol-impaired driver, which amounts to 30 people per day.12 Over
10,000 people are killed in alcohol-impaired driving crashes per year.13 It is estimated that
accidents attributable to alcohol-impaired drivers annually impose costs upward of $37 to $44
billion a year.14 Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) statistics reflect that
over one million drivers were arrested for DUI in 2018.15 Yet, this pales in comparison to the 112
million adults in America who self-report episodes of alcohol-impaired driving each year.16
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(Oct.
2017),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812450.
14
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Medical or Recreational Marijuana and Drugged Driving, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 453, 465 (2015);
Drunk Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving
(citing a 2010 study).
15
Estimated Number of Arrests, 2018 Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-29.
16
DUI Statistics, BACTRACK, https://www.bactrack.com/blogs/expert-center/35040645-dui-statistics (last visited
Oct. 16, 2019).
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A. Congress and the States’ Attempt to Remedy the Overarching Issue
Congress has long recognized the need to combat the problems created by alcohol-impaired
drivers. “Alcohol impairs balance, motor coordination, decision-making . . . [and] produces
detectable memory impairments beginning after just one or two drinks.”17 DWI and DUI laws
were enacted to directly combat this problem. Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking
Age Amendment of 1984,18 which authorized the Secretary of Transportation to “withhold a
percentage of . . . federal highway funds from states in which the purchase or public possession of
any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than 21 years of age is lawful.”19 Since then, all
states have endorsed 21 years of age as the legal drinking age and 0.08% as the BAC limit.20 Utah
has taken an initiative and recently lowered its BAC maximum threshold to 0.05%.21 The resulting
statistics from these efforts show that drunk-driving fatalities have decreased by 48%,22 and drunkdriving fatalities for motorists under the age of 21 have decreased by 80%.23 Yet the problem,
highlighted by the aforementioned statistics, is nowhere near solved.
States have gone even further and have enacted implied consent laws—which require
“motorists, as a condition of operating a vehicle within the states, to consent to BAC testing if they
are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”24 These laws also call

17

Aaron M. White, What Happened? Alcohol, Memory Blackouts, and the Brain, 27 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 186–
96 (2003) (emphasis added).
18
23 U.S.C.S. § 158 (2018).
19
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
20
Editorial Staff, Legal BAC Limits in Different States, Counties, & Cities, ALCOHOL.ORG,
https://www.alcohol.org/dui/bac-limits/ (last updated December 18, 2019).
21
Nicole Nixon, Utah First in the Nation to Lower its DUI Limit to .05 Percent, NPR,
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/26/679833767/utah-first-in-the-nation-to-lower-its-dui-limit-to-05-percent (last visited
November 7, 2019).
22
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https://www.responsibility.org/alcohol-statistics/drunk-driving-statistics/drunk-driving-fatality-statistics/ (last visited
Oct. 16, 2019).
23
Id.
24
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019); see also State v. Entrekin, 47 P.3d 336, 338 (Haw. 2002);
People v. Harris, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 2010 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2015).
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for significant consequences, varying statewide, if and when motorists withdraw consent. The
most typical punishment is an immediate suspension or revocation a motorist’s license.25 Refusal
may also be used as evidence in subsequent criminal prosecution.26 The statistics show the need
for states to keep their roads safe, and the states have tried to combat the problem accordingly.
B. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Problem
The Supreme Court has also recognized drunk driving as a significant interest.27 Because
of the “vital public interest” in highway safety,28 states have not only been tasked with removing
unsafe drivers (i.e. drunk drivers) from the road, but also to collect evidence that will stand up in
the court of law. Law enforcement officers must be able to test BAC accurately enough to be
admitted into evidence in a court proceeding.29 One of the principal methods in BAC testing is a
roadside breathalyzer, which is usually administered before an arrest is made.30 Breathalyzer tests
are the most efficient methods of testing BAC content.31 They also tend to be relatively accurate
and extremely reliable in capturing BAC evidence because federal standards require such.32 After
an arrest is made, officers usually use an “evidential breath test” at the police station.33 But,

25

Harris, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 210; but see Richard Cowen, NJ to Impose New Penalties for Drunken Driving Starting
Dec. 1: What You Need to Know, USA TODAY NETWORK, https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/2019/11/27/njnew-drunk-driving-law-take-effect-dec-1-heres-what-know/4275332002/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). NJ eliminates
license suspensions for most first-time offenders (those under a BAC of 0.15%) but requires convicted DWI drivers
to install ignition locks. Ignition locks require the motorist to have a BAC under 0.05% in order for the car to start.
26
Id.
27
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535–36. The Supreme Court has called highway safety a compelling interest and paramount.
The Court has referred to the aftermath of irresponsible driving as “slaughter comparable to the ravages of war.”
Lastly, the Court has spoken of the “frequency of preventable collisions as tragic and astounding.” Id. at 2536.
28
Id. at 2535.
29
Id. at 2536.
30
Basics of Drunk and Drugged Driving: A DUI/DWI FAQ, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/drunkdriving-dui-dwi-faq.html [hereinafter Basics of Drunk and Drugged Driving].
31
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016); See Alex Jefferson, How Do Alcohol Breathalyzers Work
and How Accurate Are They?, PROCTOR CARS, http://www.proctorcars.com/how-do-alcohol-breathalyzers-work-andhow-accurate-are-they/;
Craig
Freudenrich,
How
Breathalyzers
Work,
HOW STUFF WORKS,
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/automotive/breathalyzer.htm.
32
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2168 (stating that breathalyzers must be approved by the National Traffic Safety
Administration).
33
Basics of Drunk and Drugged Driving, supra note 30.
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officers are sometimes put in a position where individuals refuse to submit to these breathalyzer
tests, or the officer cannot obtain a proper reading because of the stupor of the motorist. The
remaining option becomes to administer a blood draw or urine test.
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be “secure in their persons . . .
against unreasonable searches” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause.”34 The extraction of a blood sample is a highly effective means of measuring BAC.35 Yet,
the Supreme Court has often ruled that blood sample tests are more invasive than breath tests and
should require a warrant in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.36 “Such an invasion of bodily
integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’”37
Hence, the Supreme Court has usually stated that “precedent normally requires a warrant for a
lawful search,” unless the search falls within a recognized exception.38
While recognizing the government’s need for evidence, the Court has recognized only a
few categorical instances under the exigent circumstances exception in which warrantless searches
are acceptable.39 Thus, while the cognizable interest of public safety and collecting evidence have
long been recognized, an individual’s right of their person has been equally, if not more important
to the Court—until Mitchell.
III. Pre-Mitchell DUI Criminal Procedure Law Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment

34

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2536 (2019) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
36
Id. at 2525; Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2160 (2016).
37
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)); see also Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
38
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2534; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148.
39
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2547. These are scenarios where officers: must enter a home to provide assistance to someone
who is seriously injured; are in pursuit of a fleeing suspect; need to enter a burning building to extinguish a fire; or
must prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. Id.
35
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Before Mitchell, DUI criminal procedure law dictated certain results whether an individual
was in the Fourth or Fifth Amendment realm. While both Amendments purport to provide
protection to those individuals suspected of DUIs, that is not necessarily the case. And while
defendants typically fared better under Fourth Amendment precedent because of the privacy
interest at stake, the Court left open the question of just how important those privacy interests are.
A. DUI and the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment states that, “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law[.]”40 Under Fifth Amendment case law, individuals generally argued, albeit with little success,
that being coerced to undergo blood tests by virtue of a statute (implied consent laws) or under the
threat of penalty, violates their constitutional right against self-incrimination and due process.41
The Court has usually held that the penalties imposed for refusing to undergo a blood draw in
connection with a DUI arrest are legitimate.42
1. The Right Against Self-Incrimination Vis-à-Vis “Coerced” Blood Test Results
In Schmerber v. California, petitioner and a companion were drinking at a bar.43 Upon
leaving, petitioner allegedly struck a tree with his vehicle, and when found by officers, was taken
to the hospital for treatment.44 Both at the scene and in the hospital two hours later, the responding
officer smelled liquor on the petitioner and observed other signs of inebriation.45 While petitioner
received treatment for injuries sustained in the accident, the officer informed the petitioner that he

40

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533.
42
Id.
43
384 U.S. 757, 758, n.2 (1966).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 769 (“[P]etitioner’s eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.’”).
41
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was under arrest.46 Subsequently, the officer asked a nearby physician to withdraw a blood sample,
despite petitioner’s refusal.47
The Court was tasked to determine “whether the withdrawal of the blood and admission in
evidence of the analysis involved in [the] case violated petitioner’s [Fifth Amendment]
privilege.”48 The Court answered in the negative, stating the privilege “protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood . . . in this case did not
involve compulsion to those ends.”49 The Court did not disagree that the BAC evidence was
invasively obtained through compulsion,50 but stated that “the privilege is implicated only when
the person is guaranteed the right to ‘remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will.’”51 Therefore, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is a "bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.’”52
2. Drivers’ Refusal of a BAC Test is Allowed to be Used in Court
Following Schmerber’s lead, the Court in South Dakota v. Neville similarly held that a
defendant’s refusal to submit to a BAC test may be used against that individual in a court of law.53
In Neville, police pulled the defendant over after he blew through a stop sign.54 The officers
immediately perceived signs of intoxication and placed the defendant under arrest when he failed

46

Id. at 758.
Id. at 759.
48
Id. at 761.
49
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
50
Id. at 762 (“The withdrawal of blood necessarily involves puncturing the skin for extraction, and . . . is evidence of
criminal guilt.”).
51
Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
52
Id. at 764.
53
459 U.S. 553 (1983).
54
Id. at 554.
47
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field sobriety tests. 55 When the officers asked the defendant to submit to a BAC test or lose his
license for refusing, the defendant admitted he would not pass the test and refused multiple times.56
South Dakota law stated that the refusal to submit to a BAC test may be admissible into
evidence at the trial.57 Furthermore, South Dakota had enacted an implied consent law which
deemed drivers to have consented to a chemical test of BAC if arrested for DWI. 58 Having both
statute and recent precedent to stand on, the Court held that “a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test,
after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.”59
The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting “the use of ‘physical
or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.”60 The state’s act (giving the
defendant a choice to submit to testing or refuse and have his license suspended) did not rise to the
level of coerced testimony.61 Hence, where a police officer has lawfully requested a blood-alcohol
test without coercion, and a defendant refuses, the defendant will be unable to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination in a subsequent court proceeding.62
The Supreme Court’s rulings on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination do
not bode well for defendants accused of DUIs when presented before a court of law. Typically, as
mentioned above, the Court does not construe physical evidence as testimonial. Therefore, the
state’s legitimate government interest in road safety, and the lack of testimonial evidence,

55

Id. at 554–55. The defendant staggered and fell against his car, reeked of alcohol, and could not walk in a straight
line.
56
Id. at 555–56.
57
Id. at 556.
58
Id. at 559.
59
Neville, 459 U.S. at 564.
60
Id. at 562.
61
Id. at 563 (“He could submit to self-accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury) or decline to testify (risking
contempt). But the Court has long recognized that the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from forcing the choice
of this ‘cruel trilemma’ on the defendant.”).
62
Id. at 564.
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outweigh an individual’s right to exclude the evidence of their own refusal.63 The Court narrowly
read the Fifth Amendment to include only certain types of testimony, none of which included
protections for DUI drivers.64 But the Court went in a different direction on the subject of an
individual’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches, specifically of their person.
B. DUI and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment guarantees an individual’s right to be “secure in their persons . . .
against unreasonable searches” and further provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause.”65 Under Fourth Amendment case law, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that blood draws constitute searches because they are intrusive in and of themselves.66 The Court
has recognized that certain elements are necessary in order for a search warrant to be valid: law
enforcement must have probable cause to request the warrant and a neutral magistrate judge must
issue it.67 “The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”68
But there are well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. First, the “exigent
circumstances” exception, which allows warrantless searches to prevent the imminent destruction
of evidence, is most often discussed in the context of BAC testing.69 Exigent circumstances
precedent requires a totality of the circumstances analysis on a case-by-case basis.70 Exigent
circumstances usually relate to imminent danger, emergency, or the destruction of evidence, along

63

See Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Id.
65
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
66
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767; Missouri v. McNeely, 569
U.S. 141, 148 (2013).
67
Timothy Andrea, Comment, The Exigencies of Drunk Driving: Cripps v. State and the Issues with Taking Drivers’
Blood Without a Warrant, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 482, 485 (2018).
68
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
69
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019).
70
Id. at 2533.
64
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with the inability to obtain a warrant.71 Aside from these scenarios, law enforcement may forego
obtaining a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and delay
would hinder the officer’s interest in preventing or investigating the alleged crime.72
The Court has also applied the “search-incident-to-arrest” doctrine, which allows officers
who are carrying out a lawful arrest to make a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person.73 Two
distinct characteristics of the exception have been noted: a search may be made (1) of the person
of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest; and (2) of the area within the control of the arrestee.74
The search-incident-to-arrest exception does not require case-by-case adjudication, but instead,
the lawful arrest alone justifies a full search of the person.75
The analysis of the cases involving blood draws under the Fourth Amendment is relatively
similar to the analysis under the Fifth Amendment: the Court (1) reviewed the factual scenario to
determine if there was probable cause for the DUI; (2) determined whether there was time to secure
a warrant or circumstances that would delay or prevent a law enforcement officer from obtaining
one; and (3) then determined if the officer’s interest in obtaining evidence was sufficient to
outweigh the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures. Most
of the time, the Court would find probable cause. The difficulty in the assessment has usually
turned on prongs two and three.
1. Exigent Circumstances Case Law
i. Schmerber v. California

Id. at 2535 n.3 (“[W]e allow police to proceed without a warrant when an occupant of a home requires “emergency
assistance,” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); when a building is on fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509 (1978); and when an armed robber has just entered a home, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976).”).
72
Andrea, supra note 67, at 485.
73
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016).
74
Id. at 2175–76.
75
Id. at 2176.
71
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In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Schmerber both on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds. As Part III(A)(1) of this Comment stated, the Court did not find the admission of the
warrantless blood search into evidence as violative of an individual’s protection against selfincrimination.76 As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court faced the question of “whether the
police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and
procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonableness.”77 Although there certainly was probable cause for the arrest,78 the Court had to
grapple with whether the officer was permitted to request the blood draw, or whether the officer
should have secured a warrant first.79
The Court approached the Fourth Amendment claim with particular concerns of an
individual’s right to be secure in their persons. The majority noted that search warrants are
required for searches “where intrusions into the human body are concerned. The requirement that
a warrant be obtained is a requirement that the inferences to support the search ‘be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer . . . .”80 “The importance of
informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another’s
body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.”81
In weighing the facts, the Court utilized a totality of the circumstances approach. The facts
revealed that the officer was delayed in arriving to the hospital where the petitioner was admitted
because the scene of the underlying accident needed to be cleared.82 The officer was in a difficult

76

See supra Part III(A)(0).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
78
Id. at 769 (“The police officer . . . smelled liquor on petitioner’s breath, and testified that petitioner’s eyes were
‘bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.’”).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 770.
81
Id. (emphasis added).
82
Id. at 770–71 (“[T]ime had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the
accident[.]”).
77
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position. The Court held in the government’s favor, noting that in this particular case, the attempt
to secure BAC evidence was proper.83 The fleeting evidence (dissipating percentage of alcohol)84
coupled with the emergency (responding to the accident) 85 caused an exigent circumstance under
the Fourth Amendment.
It is important to note two things about this decision: (1) the Court reached its judgment
“only on the facts of the present record;”86 and (2) it in no way indicates that the Constitution
permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.87 The language stresses
that the Court only reached the decision here because of the facts of this case. Thus, the Justices
may have gone the other way if the officer had not been delayed because of the accident he was
investigating. Lastly, both search-incident-to-arrest and exigent circumstances exception doctrine
share the “threatened destruction of evidence” concern. Thus, this Court’s characterization as “an
appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest” is largely insignificant.
ii. Missouri v. McNeely
In 2013, the Court was faced with a similar Schmerber situation in Missouri v. McNeely,
which involved a defendant who was speeding and swerving across a road’s center line before
being pulled over by an officer.88 When the officer witnessed more signs of drunken stupor,89 he
asked the defendant to perform field-sobriety tests, but the defendant refused to submit to a
breathalyzer.90 After further refusal by the defendant, and without ever trying to obtain a warrant,
the officer drove straight to the hospital for blood testing.91 The officer directed a hospital lab

83

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
Id. at 770.
85
Id. at 771.
86
Id. at 772.
87
Id. (emphasis added).
88
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).
89
Id. (“The officer noticed . . . McNeely’s bloodshot eyes, his slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath.”).
90
Id. at 145.
91
Id. at 145–46.
84
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technician to take a blood sample, and charged McNeely with DWI when the sample measured the
defendant’s BAC as 0.154%.92 McNeely moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing
that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment right when he took defendant’s blood without a
warrant and without consent.93 The trial court agreed with the defendant.94 On appeal, the
Missouri Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court.
Missouri’s Supreme Court looked directly to Schmerber and recognized that lower courts
must engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis when “determining whether exigency
permits a nonconsensual, warrantless blood draw.”95 Furthermore, the Missouri Supreme Court
concluded that Schmerber “requires more than the mere dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence to
support a warrantless blood draw in an alcohol related case.”96 Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of “whether natural
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its own to
justify an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving
investigations.”97 The Court stressed that an invasion of person is readily apparent when a needle
is shoved under the skin and into the veins.98 When such an invasion is present, there is significant
importance in a “neutral and detached magistrate” to make the decision to proceed with the request
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or not.99 Lastly, the Court stressed the importance of performing a totality of the circumstances
analysis, stating that each case must be evaluated on its own facts.100
In the present case, the Court noted that BAC evidence dissipates in a “gradual and
relatively predictable” manner.101 Thus, the Court held, “in those drunk-driving investigations
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they
do so.”102 The Court recognized the important reality that officers can take steps to secure a
warrant in an efficient and quick manner in today’s technologically advanced society. First, an
officer can attempt to secure a warrant while the suspect is being transported to a medical
facility.103 Next, under the amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, magistrate judges may
issue a warrant based on sworn testimony communicated over the phone or other reliable electronic
means.104 Furthermore, jurisdictions have streamlined the warrant process by providing standardform warrant applications for drunk-driving investigations.105 The Court also mentioned that
“experts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the sample was taken to determine the
BAC at the time of the alleged offense.”106 The technological advancements have made it so police
officers may secure warrants more quickly, while leaving the assessment of exigency in the hands
of a neutral magistrate judge, as past precedent has always required.
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Lastly, the Court recognized that although there is a need to secure such evidence, states
have enacted laws—namely implied consent laws—that provide penalties for a driver’s refusal to
submit to BAC testing.107 As noted under Fifth Amendment precedent, states may use a driver’s
refusal to submit to a BAC test as evidence in court and may even revoke or suspend the alleged
drunk driver’s license. The Court also noted that a “majority of [s]tates either place significant
restrictions on when police officers may obtain a blood sample despite a suspect’s refusal . . . or
prohibit nonconsensual blood tests altogether.”108 Evidence suggests that in states that permit
nonconsensual blood testing pursuant to a warrant, their use reduces “breath-test-refusal rates and
improve[s] law enforcement’s ability to recover BAC evidence.”109 In weighing the totality of the
circumstances, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the
bloodstream presents no per se exigency to justify a blood test without a warrant.110
2. Search-Incident-to-Arrest Case Law
In 2016, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the search-incident-to-arrest
exception provides a mechanism by which officers may force individuals suspected of DUIs to
submit to blood sample draws.111 In Birchfield, the petitioner drove his car off of a highway and
into a ditch.112 Upon seeing the petitioner struggle to back out of the ditch, a state trooper
approached his car and recognized the telltale signs of drunkenness: strong scents of alcohol,
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bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred speech.113 The officer then administered a breathalyzer
test with the consent of petitioner, which read a BAC of 0.254%, over three times the legal limit.114
Officers ordinarily do not use road-side breathalyzer tests for evidentiary purposes, so the
responding officer advised the petitioner of his obligation under North Dakota law to undergo
further BAC testing.115 The petitioner refused to agree to a blood draw, and subsequently plead
guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the refusal statute.116 In the trial court, petitioner argued that
the Fourth Amendment prohibited criminalizing his refusal to submit to the blood draw.117 The
trial court rejected this argument, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.118
Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment for BAC testing,
the Court balanced the need for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests versus an
individual’s right against intrusion into their privacy.119 In deciding the case, the Supreme Court
stressed, as it has in the exigent circumstances exception realm, that BAC tests (whether through
breath or blood) are searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.120 The Court also
distinguished the differences in breath and blood tests. Breath tests implicate fewer privacy
concerns because: (1) they are not intrusive (an individual only blows into a tube); (2) only reveal
one piece of information (the amount of alcohol in the subject’s breath); and (3) blowing into a
tube is not an experience likely to cause any further embarrassment inherent in any arrest.121 To
the contrary, blood tests do implicate privacy concerns because: (1) they require piercing of the
skin and extraction of a part of an individual’s body, and (2) the sample gives law enforcement
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authorities information that can provide details outside of the scope of the drunk-driving arrest.122
The Court also noted that states and the federal government have already imposed numerous
measures to deter potential drunk drivers.123
The reality is that police officers often face quick judgment calls that the Fourth
Amendment does not require to be broken down and logged in a specific manner. 124 States,
rightfully so, are concerned with evidence being lost because of the often difficult decisions that
officers need to make—tend to the situation at hand versus trying to secure a warrant. With these
governmental concerns in the forefront, the Court proceeded to discuss the need for warrants.
Warrants protect privacy in two ways: (1) “[T]hey ensure that a search is not carried out unless a
neutral magistrate makes an independent determination that there is probable cause to believe that
evidence will be found; and (2) if probable cause is found by the magistrate, the warrant “limits
the intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the search.”125
In evaluating whether the blood draw was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court stressed that the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not depend on an evaluation of the
threat of evidence loss in a particular case.126 Instead, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine is
limited by the nature of the privacy interest at stake.127 Thus, the Court concluded that BAC testing
of drunk-driving suspects under the search-incident-to-arrest exception permits a warrantless
breath test, but not blood test.128 The privacy concerns of individuals implicated by breath tests is
minimal, while the states’ interest in the BAC test is great.129 Yet, “[b]lood tests are significantly
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more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less
invasive alternative of a breath test.”130
The Court made one final conclusion that will become the basis of this Comment:
It is true that a blood test . . . may be administered to a person who is unconscious
. . . or who is unable to do what is needed to take a breath test[.] But we have no
reason to believe that such situations are common in drunk-driving arrests, and
when they arise, the police may apply for a warrant if need be.131
The Court foresaw that there may come a time where a breath test is impossible and a blood draw
might be necessary, but a warrant still should be sought. Thus, the Court has still not provided a
categorical exception when it comes to blood draws at this time, even after Mitchell.
C. Prior Case Law and How the Court has Discussed Exigent Circumstances, Intrusions, and
Government Interests
The aforementioned case law demonstrates that the Court, in its discussion of the relevant
Fourth Amendment protections, focused primarily on the right of individuals to be protected
against unwarranted intrusion by the state132 versus the need for law enforcement to secure
evidence to determine what is reasonable. Thus far, the Supreme Court has regularly stated that
“precedent normally requires a warrant for a lawful search,” unless the search falls within a
recognized exception.133 The Court has especially opined that in the context of blood draws, “such
an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy.’”134 In sum, the Court’s language implies that unwanted blood draws are
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extremely problematic because of their invasiveness.135 This was true in both the search-incidentto-arrest exception and the exigent circumstances case law.
Further, the warrant requirement is not just a mere formality, but serves important
purposes. Search warrants protect privacy in two main ways. Since the invasion into another’s
body in search of evidence of guilt is great, the importance of requiring authorization by a neutral
and detached magistrate is indisputable.136 This is further supported by the fact that an officer is
often engaged in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”137 Thus, having a neutral
magistrate make an independent determination that probable cause exists to believe that evidence
will be found is an important protection against unreasonable searches.138 Secondly, if probable
cause is found, the warrant would limit the “intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the
search—that is, the area that can be searched and the items that can be sought.” 139 The warrant
requirement ensures that our rights as individuals are protected to the fullest extent possible.
Even more telling is the fact that warrants have become easier to secure now. As Missouri
v. McNeely recognized, federal magistrate judges may issue warrants based on sworn testimony
communicated over the phone or other reliable electronic means.140 A majority of states now allow
officers or prosecutors “to apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including
telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail and video
conferencing.”141 Warrants can now be secured in as little as five to fifteen minutes, suggesting
the cases where exigency is actually compelling are few.142
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Lastly, the Court has accounted for the government’s interest in securing evidence to
convict individuals of the alleged crime they have committed. Without evidence that will stand
up in the court of law (accurate BAC measurements), the government will have a lesser chance to
convict the accused.143 This is especially important given that the percentage of alcohol in an
individual’s body decreases from the moment they stop drinking. 144 The need to keep roadways
safe against the evils of DUI is another key factor.145
Therefore, the Court has always addressed an individual’s right to privacy against
unwarranted searches and seizures as vital. The Court has stopped short of saying that blood draws
are acceptable under a searches-incident-to-arrest exception because the blood draw intrudes on
an individual’s liberty.146 In the exigent circumstances line of cases, the Court has consistently
called for a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether the officer indeed had no
time to secure a warrant.147 Search warrants have long been held to protect the rights of
individuals, and this is no different in the blood draw line of cases. But what the Court had not yet
addressed was whether the privacy interest is so significant that mandating a blood draw is
consistent with precedent, or treads in new territory.
IV. The Mitchell v. Wisconsin Decision and its Implications
The story of Mitchell is similar to every DUI case discussed thus far: a motorist is detained
by law enforcement, the responding officer witnesses signs of inebriation, and subsequently
attempts to secure BAC evidence for a conviction. But this time, there was no victory for the
driver who attempted to get the unconsented blood draw results suppressed. This section will
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focus on the sharp contrast between the plurality, the concurrence, and the dissent, and the
important takeaways from all sides.
A. Facts of Mitchell
A Sheboygan Police Department officer received a tip that petitioner Mitchell appeared to
be drunk upon climbing into his vehicle and driving off.148 Upon finding Mitchell near a lake, the
officer noticed that Mitchell was showing the suggestive signs of intoxication: slurred speech,
stumbling movement, and the inability to stand upright without the help of two responding
officers.149 After Mitchell’s preliminary breathalyzer test recorded a BAC level of 0.24%, he was
arrested and was to be driven to the police station for an evidentiary grade breathalyzer.150
As the officers began to transport Mitchell, they realized that his condition was worsening.
By the time they reached the station, Mitchell could not even take the necessary breath test.151 As
Mitchell’s condition further deteriorated, the officers decided to head to the hospital for a blood
test.152 Mitchell then lost consciousness and had to be wheeled into the hospital.153 Nevertheless,
the officer read Mitchell the rights of refusal statements associated with Wisconsin’s implied
consent law and upon hearing no response, asked hospital staff to administer the blood draw, which
produced a BAC of 0.222%.154 Notably, this reading was done ninety minutes after his arrest.155
Mitchell was ultimately charged and convicted of violating two drunk-driving provisions,
which he challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds against unreasonable searches, stating that
the blood draw was conducted without his consent and without a warrant.156 Mitchell argued, to
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no avail, that the BAC evidence should have been suppressed.157 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether a statute
authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.”158
B. The Plurality’s Opinion Produces a Puzzling “Almost Always” Test
The plurality started its analysis by stating that past decisions have been based on the
“precedent regarding the specific constitutional claims in each case, while keeping in mind the
wider regulatory scheme developed over the years to combat drunk driving.”159 This signals that
the plurality does not view Mitchell as necessary falling into the exigent circumstances or searchincident-to-arrest doctrines. Specifically, in Part II of the Mitchell opinion, the Supreme Court
goes through case law primarily centered on the Fifth Amendment, where it has approved of
enforcing BAC tests promoted by implied consent laws. But, as discussed in Part III(A) and III(B)
of this Comment, there was a vast difference in the outcomes for petitioners in the Fifth versus
Fourth Amendment cases.160
While admitting in Part II of Mitchell’s opinion that “precedent normally requires a warrant
for a lawful search,” the Court noted there are “well-defined exceptions to this rule.”161 The Court
quickly mentioned Birchfield as a case where the search-incident-to-arrest exception to BAC
testing was applied, and where the Court ultimately held that a drunk-driving arrest taken alone
will justify a warrantless breath test, but not a blood test.162 The Court then moved on to McNeely,
where it held that the exigent circumstances exception allows warrantless searches to “prevent the
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imminent destruction of evidence;” however, the “fleeting quality of BAC evidence alone” was
not enough.163 So far, so good for petitioner.
Then, the plurality discussed Schmerber, where it held that a blood test was justified when
a delay would threaten the destruction of evidence and pressing needs (i.e. safety, health, etc.) were
extant.164 That case, as discussed, was based solely on its own facts. The Supreme Court’s
plurality opinion in Mitchell nonetheless found that this case was similar to Schmerber on the
spectrum of exception cases, in that Mitchell’s drunken stupor and unconsciousness created a
medical condition that needed to be treated with urgency.165 Furthermore, his intoxicated state
“deprived officials of a reasonable opportunity to administer a [standard evidentiary] breath
test.”166 The relevant question then becomes, what is an officer to do when a driver’s stupor
“eliminates any reasonable opportunity for that kind of breath test.”167
But in Part III of the opinion, the plurality shifted its analysis and focused on the broader
regulatory scheme, defined as the government’s interest in protecting roads from unsafe drivers.
“Highway safety is a vital public interest.”168 The Court harped on the point that alcohol-related
accidents have taken roughly 10,000 to 20,000 lives per year since 1982169 and recognized that the
BAC limits adopted by every state have decreased over the years to the 0.08% limit currently.170
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States have also enacted penalties for drivers who exceed a higher BAC threshold, which the Court
opined has led to a decrease in the number of annual fatalities.171
Enforcing BAC limits requires a test that will stand up in court, and blood samples are a
“highly effective means of measuring the influence of alcohol.”172 The Court stated that testing
must be done promptly because “it is a biological certainty that alcohol dissipates from the
bloodstream at a rate of 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent per hour.”173 Lastly, the Court claimed that
when a driver becomes unconscious, blood tests are “essential for achieving the compelling
interests described above.”174 The Court’s plurality creates a fork in the road; does the case truly
drive towards the exigent circumstances line of cases, or, does the plurality try to bucket Mitchell
in both an exigent circumstances and a regulatory reasonableness style analysis?
In order to reach its conclusion, the Court related this case to Schmerber, which follows
the premise that “exigency exists when: (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor
creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant
application.”175 The Court then said that unconsciousness not only creates a pressing need but is
itself a medical emergency.176 To the plurality, it is possible that officers may have to provide
other assistance when responding to a drunk-driving related incident, and thus, we cannot put
officers in a position to “choose between prioritizing a warrant application to the detriment of
critical health and safety needs, and delaying the warrant application, and thus the BAC test, to the
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detriment of its evidentiary value and all the compelling interests served by BAC limits.”177
Although the Court accepted the proposition that technology has made warrant applications much
quicker, it further opined that the time to secure a warrant has not disappeared.178
The Court ostensibly hinged its holding on the compelling interests of the government:
When police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunkdriving offense and the driver’s unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken
to a hospital or similar facility before police have a reasonable opportunity to
administer a standard evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a
warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s BAC without offending the Fourth
Amendment.179
But, the Court did not rule out the possibility that “a defendant would be able to show that his
blood would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, and that police
could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing
needs or duties.”180
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence Calls for a Categorical Exception
On the other hand, Justice Thomas viewed the plurality’s rule as “difficult-to-administer”
and stated, “[e]xigent circumstances are generally present when police encounter a person
suspected of drunk driving—except when they aren’t.”181

His Honor opined that “it will

nevertheless burden both officers and courts who must attempt to apply it.”182 Instead, Justice
Thomas called for a per se rule, which posited that regardless of the driver’s consciousness, the
natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream alone creates an exigency once the police
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have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk.183 Justice Thomas’s route, if that of the majority
in the future, would modify Birchfield to create a much more lenient standard for officers, giving
them carte blanche to execute blood draws at any reasonable suspicion of inebriation.
The concurrence admitted that Fourth Amendment case law has required that a warrant
must generally be secured, but stated that the imminent destruction of evidence is at risk in every
single drunk-driving arrest, which implicates the exigent circumstances doctrine. 184

Thus,

according to Justice Thomas, the per se rule would not undermine the totality of the circumstances
analysis endorsed by McNeely and Birchfield because a certain, dispositive fact is always present
in DUI cases—destruction of evidence vis-à-vis metabolization of alcohol.185 Lastly, Justice
Thomas took one last jab at the plurality by concluding its rule was “more likely to confuse than
clarify” because officers and courts will be burdened by the plurality’s rebuttable presumption.186
D. The Scathing Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by two other Justices, attacks the
plurality’s proposition that police will be forced to choose between an emergency situation and
securing evidence. Pointing to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Sotomayor stated that when there
is time to secure a warrant, one must be sought.187 To the dissent, the fact that Wisconsin admitted
that the officer had time secure a warrant to draw Mitchell’s blood should have ended the
inquiry.188 The dissent further harped that Wisconsin did not even argue that this was an exigent
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circumstances exception case, but instead, claimed that the blood draw was lawful because of the
implied consent statute.189
After describing the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees, the dissent stated that “[t]he warrant
requirement is not a mere formality; it ensures that necessary judgment calls are made ‘by a neutral
and detached magistrate,’ not by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.”190 A warrant ensures that a police officer is not made to be the sole interpreter of the
Constitution’s protections.191 According to the dissent, it is only when an exception applies that
law enforcement will not violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment right.192 Justice Sotomayor
opined, “For decades, this Court has stayed true to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
. . . even in the face of attempts categorically to exempt blood testing from its protections.”193
Had precedent been followed, the answer would have been straightforward. In Schmerber,
the exigent circumstances justified the search because of the unusual delay of the investigation by
the responding officer, which provided no time to seek a warrant.194 In McNeely, the Court ruled
that blood tests are not categorically exempt from the warrant requirement, and instead, each case
must be determined on its own facts (as was Schmerber).195 Chief Justice Roberts stated there that
“the Fourth Amendment mandates officers to obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be
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drawn.”196 In Birchfield, the Court again rejected a categorical attempt to exempt blood draws
from the warrant requirement in relation to the searches-incident-to-arrest doctrine.197
Thus, the dissent said, Mitchell should have been resolved squarely by past precedent.
Unless time did not permit an officer from obtaining a warrant, they must get one before ordering
a blood draw.198 Just seven years ago, McNeely reiterated the standard necessary to resolve DUI
cases involving exigent circumstances. There, the Court made many points that are even more
relevant today. First, blood draws are different than the categorical approaches that the Court has
allowed in the past in “destruction of evidence” cases,199 namely because there are inherent delays
when an officer seeks a blood test, regardless of whether or not a warrant is obtained.200 Police
officers will almost always have to transport an individual to the hospital or medical facility for a
medical professional to draw blood. That in itself may give officers time to seek a warrant.201
According to the dissent, “[E]xperts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the
sample was taken to determine the BAC at the time of the alleged offense.” 202 Magistrate judges
may issue warrants through sworn testimony over the phone or other means, which has sped up
the process to the point where judges can issue warrants in five to fifteen minutes.203 Lastly, and
maybe most importantly, BAC dissipates gradually and predictably.204 These facts, relevant in
McNeely, are even more pertinent now with our ever advancing society.
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This analysis leads back to the very important point that Schmerber and McNeely advocated
for in the first place—the fact that not every case will be the same, and each will require a holistic
assessment.205 In many scenarios, as in Mitchell itself, the police will have enough time to secure
a warrant and address the medical needs of an individual prior to the evidence dissipating.206 Thus,
the dissent opined that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as well as past precedent,
dictates that officers must seek a warrant prior to attempting to draw blood from a person suspected
of drunk driving.207 The plurality’s decision takes away the police’s heavy burden to justify a
warrantless search to one of only urgent need.208
V. Mitchell v. Wisconsin Creates a Fork in the Road on Where it Sits in DUI Case Law
Other than the confusing “almost always” rule that comes out of Mitchell, the opinion is
also dissimilar to the Court’s pronouncements in the cases mentioned in Section III of this
Comment. The Court has consistently refused to categorically include blood draws under the
exigent circumstance or search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment, yet Mitchell
goes the other way when the driver is unconscious.209
A. Which Road Should Lower Courts Travel: The Regulatory Reasonableness or Exigent
Circumstances Road?
The plurality started off by analyzing Fourth Amendment precedent and what is required
when assessing claims.210 The opinion could have been decided on these grounds alone under the
exigent circumstances exception doctrine. But the Court decided to go further and in Section III
of the opinion,211 and weighed the interests of the government in addressing the larger regulatory
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problem—unsafe public roads due to impaired drivers. With the bifurcated opinion, the question
becomes whether DUI case law is about exigent circumstances or truly about keeping roads safe.
The difference is imperative in deciding whether we resolve future cases on public policy grounds
or stick to the traditional analysis. For lower courts, the question becomes, which part of the
opinion control?212
There is an inherent question of deference when deciding cases using the traditional
analysis (exigent circumstances) versus public policy grounds (keeping roads safe). It suffices to
say that the latter is more deferential to law enforcement, similar to rational basis review of
constitutionality. With the bifurcated opinion, the plurality makes it tough to follow what the basis
was for its ultimate decision: exigent circumstances or the need for law enforcement officers to
respond to situations without further endangering the public. Justice Alito seemingly harped on
the idea that officers cannot be forced to choose between attempting to procure a warrant versus
attending to the needs at hand.213
Of course, not all searches are violative of the Fourth Amendment—only those that are
unreasonable.214 Time and time again the Court has held that a blood draw is intrusive in and of
itself.215 The Court has also stated that BAC evidence dissipating, alone, is never enough for the
exigency circumstance exception to apply.216 In stark contrast to past precedent, the Mitchell Court
decided that the elements of public safety and government enforcement of DUI laws were enough
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to cross the line of reasonableness to circumvent an individual’s constitutionally-protected right
against unreasonable searches.217 The Court’s statistical analysis of drunk driving incidents in the
United States put the nail in the coffin in its ruling, making it known that a drunk driver is not
considered on equal footing as others.218 The statistical analysis is used as a guidepost to show
that the Court was driven by public policy, something that it had not necessarily relied upon in
previous DUI exigent circumstances case law. The plurality opinion is paradigmatic in this
respect: DUI case law is no longer exclusively within the province of warrantless exceptions
analysis; instead, it is now underneath a broader umbrella that purely assesses reasonableness.
The plurality had a relatively easy route to conclude the same way without focusing on the
implications of road safety. The Court discussed the exigent circumstances exception and posited
that unconsciousness is a medical emergency within itself.219 Fleeting evidence due to the
emergency created by the unconsciousness would provide the requisite combination to satisfy DUI
exigent circumstances precedent. This would also follow the holistic analysis that is central to
every exigent circumstance case.

While still problematic because of the distinctions with

Schmerber,220 this route could have achieved the same result without the doctrinal confusion.
B. Trying to Apply Mitchell to New Facts
If the facts of Mitchell are changed just nominally, it becomes difficult to determine how a
reviewing court should rule on a defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge. Take, for example,
the following scenario. First, assume that Mitchell is still visibly inebriated. He then gets in his
van, turns it on, turns on the heat, pulls the seat back in recline, and starts to doze off. A bar patron
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who noticed Mitchell leave, now sees him in the vehicle and decides to call for help. When officers
respond, they tap on the window to inquire further.
The officers observe that Mitchell is falling in and out of consciousness, so they decide to
request a breathalyzer test. Since Mitchell is incapable of blowing into the breathalyzer, the
officers take him directly to an urgent care for a blood draw. Although Mitchell does not consent
to the blood draw, the officers, relying on Mitchell v. Wisconsin, go ahead and order one anyway.
How should a defense attorney proceed? More importantly, how should the court decide the case?
If Mitchell’s attorney argues that Mitchell’s blood draw should be suppressed under the
regulatory road of the plurality’s opinion, Mitchell would lose before he steps foot in court. The
line of thought here goes, the arrest and ensuing blood draw were both proper because Mitchell
was a danger to the public when he entered his vehicle. It was paramount that officers kept him
off the road, even though he was not yet driving, to ensure that no one would possibly become
another statistical victim of another DUI accident. Furthermore, since Mitchell was clearly
inebriated and falling in and out of consciousness, and could not perform a breathalyzer test, the
only way to secure evidence was through a blood draw. The court, for the sake of efficiency and
following the spirit of Mitchell’s opinion, would be inclined to take this route as well.
An entirely more difficult analysis proceeds from the second, more windy, exigent
circumstances exception road. Defense counsel would prefer this route because the government
must show more than keeping roads safe. The Mitchell Court reaffirms that the natural dissipation
of alcohol is not enough to trigger a blood draw under the exigent circumstances prong. Therefore,
the reviewing court would have to rely on Mitchell’s condition when the officers approached him.
Although he was deemed to be falling in and out of consciousness, there could be numerous
explanations for such. It could have been just because of the heat in his vehicle. It could have
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been because he was too drunk. The analysis would be more difficult because it would hinge on
whether evidence needed to be secured (because it was dissipating) and whether a pressing need
took priority over a warrant application. While the government could easily show the first prong
was satisfied, the “pressing need” prong becomes murky. If the court holds a pressing need was
non-existent, would it, like Mitchell, add a public policy argument to prevent the defendant from
getting off scot-free? The difficulty, even in a scenario with slight factual changes, shows that this
case was decided in a manner that can lead to confusion, and needs to be clarified moving forward.
VI. Conclusion
The dissent’s opinion has an important message that applies sensibly in the context of the
Fourth Amendment: if there is time for a warrant, one should be secured.221 Warrants are important
for numerous reasons and the Court has consistently advised that BAC testing should be left in the
hands of neutral and detached magistrates, so as to not leave law enforcement as the sole
interpreters of the Constitution’s protections.222 Today, there should be more focus on an
individual’s right to privacy and to be free from searches. Mitchell permits future courts reviewing
DUI cases to apply a highly deferential standard—related to keeping the roads safe. That was not
the intention of the Fourth Amendment and should not be the case today.
Regardless of where one surmises Mitchell fits in DUI case law, it is clear that the Court
has expanded the exigent circumstances DUI doctrine to cast a wider net for the government to
prosecute offenders under one of two avenues. The opinion currently creates an ironic hangover
in that defense attorneys, courts, and law enforcement officers, will be unsure of which fork in the
road will be the proper route to journey on. In order to clarify the confusion, the Court will need
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to clearly define whether future DUI cases are subject to the traditional analysis consisting of the
exigent circumstances exception, or whether the cases should be assessed in light of the
government’s need to remove drunk drivers from the road as a matter of public safety.
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